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Abstract
Ethanol made from corn comprises 10% of US gasoline, up from 3% in 2003. This
dramatic increase was spurred by recent policy initiatives such as the Renewable Fuel
Standard and state-level blend mandates, and supported by direct subsidies such as the
Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit. Some proponents of ethanol have argued that
ethanol production greatly lowers gasoline prices, with one industry group claiming it
reduced gasoline prices by 89 cents in 2010 and $1.09 in 2011. The estimates have
been cited in numerous speeches by Secretary of Agriculture Thomas Vilsack. These
estimates are based on a series of papers by Xiaodong Du and Dermot Hayes. We
show that these results are driven by implausible economic assumptions and spurious
statistical correlations. To support this last point, we use the same statistical mod-
els and ﬁnd that ethanol production “decreases” natural gas prices, but “increases”
unemployment in both the US and Europe. We even show that ethanol production
“increases” the ages of our children.
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“As a result of our biofuel industries, consumers across America are paying about $0.90, on
average, less for gas than they would otherwise pay. So, it’s a great opportunity for consumer
choice, it’s a job creator, and it improves income opportunities for farmers.”
— Secretary of Agriculture Thomas Vilsack, 10/24/11.
1 Introduction
The median American household spent over 8 percent of its income on gasoline in 2011.
Gasoline price ﬂuctuations therefore signiﬁcantly aﬀect household budgets, and government
policies that aﬀect gasoline prices resonate widely. The most prominent recent policy has
been to promote the use of ethanol as an ingredient in gasoline. This year, 10 percent
of ﬁnished motor gasoline in the United States will be comprised of ethanol made from
corn, up from 3 percent in 2003. The main forms of government support have been explicit
subsidies through the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) and even larger
implicit subsidies through such policies as the Renewable Fuel Standard and state-level
blend mandates.1 The beneﬁts of ethanol over gasoline are that it diversiﬁes our fuel mix,
can have lower emissions, and increases farmer wealth. An additional potential beneﬁt is
that it may relieve gasoline reﬁning capacity constraints during peak demand periods; this
would in turn lead to lower gasoline prices.
The national trade association for the U.S. ethanol industry, the Renewable Fuel As-
sociation (RFA), recently launched an advertising campaign claiming ethanol production
lowered gasoline prices by 89 cents in 2010 and $1.09 in 2011 (see Figures 1 through 3). The
estimates have been cited numerous times by Secretary of Agriculture Thomas Vilsack (see
the opening quote of this paper for one example). These estimates are based on a series of
papers by University of Wisconsin and Iowa State University economists Xiaodong Du and
Dermot Hayes2, who use monthly regional data to estimate the relationship between ethanol
production and the proﬁt margin for oil reﬁners.
Given the obvious importance of these estimates, we investigate their robustness. We
show that they are driven by implausible economic assumptions and spurious statistical
correlations. Put simply, the empirical results merely reﬂect the fact that ethanol production
increased during the sample period whereas the ratio of gasoline to crude oil prices decreased.
These trends make the empirical analysis extremely sensitive to model speciﬁcation; however,
we ﬁnd that empirical models that are most consistent with economic and statistical theory
1See Carter et al. (2012) for more on the growth of the ethanol industry and its aﬀect on agricultural
markets.
2Du and Hayes (2009), Du and Hayes (2011), and Du and Hayes (2012).
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Figure 1: Renewable Fuel Association ad campaign, 2010
Note: http://domesticfuel.com/2011/07/26/rfa-ads-tout-ethanol-reducing-gas-prices/.
suggest eﬀects that are near zero and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Because ethanol production increased smoothly during the sample period, statistical
analysis with this variable is fraught with danger. It is strongly correlated with any trending
variable. To illustrate this point, we take the same empirical models in Du and Hayes
(2011) and Du and Hayes (2012) and use them to “explain” variables that have no material
relationship to US ethanol production: the US price of natural gas and unemployment rates
in the US and the European Union. Our resulting estimates suggest that increases in ethanol
production “cause” reductions in natural gas prices but increases in unemployment. The
estimates imply that, had we eliminated ethanol in 2010, natural gas prices would have risen
by 65 percent and unemployment would have dropped by 60 percent in the US, 12 percent
in the EU, and 42 percent in the UK. To further underscore this point, we provide a silly
example. Again, using the same empirical models in Du and Hayes (2011) and Du and Hayes
(2012), we show that ethanol production “causes” our children to age. Obviously, anyone
using these models to advocate eliminating ethanol production to end the Great Recession
or make children age more quickly would be greeted by extreme skepticism. We encourage
similar skepticism about the estimated eﬀect of ethanol on gasoline prices generated from
these models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the economics of
how ethanol production may inﬂuence gasoline prices. Understanding these basic economic
concepts puts useful bounds on the eﬀect. Section 3 discusses how these basic concepts
can guide the choice of the empirical model. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical models
2
Figure 2: Renewable Fuel Association ad campaign, 2011
Note: http://chooseethanol.com/page/-/ee/rfa-assoc/rotator/2011 Gas Price Ad.gif
Figure 3: Renewable Fuel Association Metro Bus Billboard
Note: http://www.abengoa.es/htmlsites/boletines/en/octubre2011/produccion.html.
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we employ. The data are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 reports the estimated results
from the models used in Du and Hayes and alternative speciﬁcations. Section 7 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Economics
We begin with a basic discussion of how ethanol production might inﬂuence gasoline prices.
In doing so we discuss the channels through which this is possible and stress the diﬀerence
between short-run eﬀects—those that might last one or two months—and long-run eﬀects—
those price eﬀects that can be sustained in the industry. Simple economic calculations allow
us to place loose bounds on the impact ethanol production could have on the price of gasoline
in both the short and long run.
The largest component of the price of gasoline is the cost associated with crude oil. A
barrel of oil contains 42 gallons, so every dollar per barrel increase in oil prices raises wholesale
gasoline prices by about 2.4 cents. Thus, when oil is $100 per barrel, roughly $2.40 of the
price of gasoline will be the cost of crude. Ethanol production has a minimal impact on
the price of crude oil. In the world market for crude oil, an individual country’s supply and
demand decisions are small relative to the market as a whole—even for a country the size
of the US. To put this into perspective, the US consumes roughly 20 percent of world oil.
Roughly half of the US oil consumption goes toward gasoline and ethanol comprises roughly
10 percent of our gasoline-blend fuel. Thus, on a volumetric basis, US ethanol constitutes
about 1 percent of world oil use. However, ethanol has 33.3 percent less energy than gasoline
and thus engines require more ethanol than gasoline to go the same distance. So, US ethanol
replaces just 0.67 percent of world oil. Crude-oil supply and demand would need to be very
inelastic before such a quantity had a noticeable eﬀect on price (see Rajagopal et al. (2007)
and DeGorter and Just (2009)).
Ethanol production may aﬀect gasoline prices through other channels, however. Retail
gasoline prices typically exceed crude oil prices by $0.70-$1.20 per gallon, although this price
spread can spike much higher for short periods of time. About 45 cents of this premium
represents state and federal taxes and the remainder is the margin associated with the reﬁning
and transportation of gasoline.3 Du and Hayes focus on the reﬁning margin. They estimate
3Ethanol is an ingredient in gasoline, so the retail price of gasoline also depends on the price of this
ingredient. If the energy-equivalent price of ethanol is less than that of wholesale gasoline, then using more
ethanol lowers the price of gasoline and vice versa. Apart from the summer of 2006, when a supply crunch
caused ethanol prices to spike, the relative prices of ethanol and wholesale gasoline have been similar enough
that the marginal eﬀect of using more of one ingredient than the other has not been more than a few cents
per gallon, after accounting for diﬀerences in tax treatment and energy content (DeGorter and Just (2009)).
Like Du and Hayes, we do not study this channel any further.
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the relationship between ethanol production and two measures of the reﬁning margin: the
crack spread and crack ratio. The crack spread equals the weighted average price of the two
main reﬁned products (gasoline and distillate fuel oil) minus the price of crude oil. Du and
Hayes deﬁne the crack ratio as the price of gasoline divided by the price of oil. They conclude
that the reﬁning margin would have expanded by $0.89 if ethanol had been removed from
the market in 2010 and $1.09 if it had been removed in 2011.
From every 100 gallons of crude oil, the typical oil reﬁnery produces 46 gallons of gasoline
and 28 gallons of distillate, which is used mostly for diesel fuel and heating oil. In addition, it
produces 6 gallons of still gas and petroleum coke that is re-used as fuel in the reﬁning process
and about 27 gallons of other products such as jet fuel, kerosene, feedstock for petrochemical
use, petroleum coke for sale, and liquiﬁed reﬁnery gases.4 The sum of reﬁnery outputs equals
107 gallons because the reﬁned products are less dense than crude oil, so they have greater
volume. Based on this output mix, the most common approximation to the proﬁt margin
for oil reﬁners is the 3:2:1 crack spread, which is:
crack spread =
2
3
pricegas +
1
3
pricedist − priceoil, (1)
where each price is measured in dollars per gallon.
Although it is often referred to as a measure of proﬁt, the crack spread also includes
reﬁning costs. The largest single cost of operating a reﬁnery is energy, which makes up
about half of operating costs.5 Most of this energy is generated by burning by-products of
the reﬁning process, but a typical reﬁnery also uses quantities of natural gas and electricity
with energy equivalent to 3% of the crude oil processed.6 In addition, the reﬁning industry
uses 3 gallons of natural gas plant liquids (NGPL) as a raw material for every 100 gallons
of crude oil. NGPLs are hydocarbons in natural gas that are lighter than most crude oil
and produce feedstocks for petrochemical products as well as some gasoline and distillates.
Thus, based on energy costs and NGPL use, we expect the crack spread to expand when the
prices of crude oil and natural gas increase and to contract when these prices decrease.
Figure 5 plots the crack spread for each Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts
(PADD) over time.7 PADDs are regions of the country represented in Figure 4. The average
4These quantities are based on data from the Energy Information Administration. Speciﬁcally, we use
the Reﬁnery Yield (http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_pct_dc_nus_pct_m.htm) and Fuel Consumed
(http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_capfuel_dcu_nus_a.htm) tables.
5See http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/frs/frstables.cfm?tableNumber=28.
6We convert all quantities to energy equivalent terms using the assumptions that one gallon of crude oil
equals 114,000 BTU, one cubic foot of natural gas equals 319 BTU, and one kilowatt hour of electricity
equals 3,413 BTU.
7For the reﬁned products, we use the total gasoline wholesale/resale price by reﬁners and the wholesale
price of no.2 distillate fuel (diesel), and for the input price we use the national average reﬁner acquisition
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Figure 4: Map of Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADDs)
crack spread from 1995 to 2011 was 41 cents per gallon, in 2011 dollars; the crack spread was
also below 48 cents 75 percent of the time. During this time period the lowest crack spread
was 15 cents in February of 1999 in PADD III, and the highest was $1.17 in PADD IV in
May of 2007. The high crack spread of $1.17 was very short lived, falling by 20 cents in June
and then another 20 cents in July. These ranges make it seem implausible that removing
ethanol production in 2010 or 2011 would have caused the crack spread to expand by $0.89
or $1.09 for a whole year.
There is an economic reason why the crack spread has not exceeded 60 cents for more than
a few brief periods in the last 30 years.8 When the crack spread is high, large proﬁts encourage
entry into the reﬁning industry, which in turns puts downward pressure on the crack spread.
Similarly, when the crack spread is too low, reﬁneries will no longer be proﬁtable, and exit
must occur. This will in turn put upward pressure on the crack spread. For the industry to
be in a long-run equilibrium, the crack spread must be high enough for reﬁneries to cover
cost of crude oil. PADD-speciﬁc crude oil acquisition costs exist only back to 2004, which is why we use the
national series. The gasoline prices exclude taxes. According to their description, these are the same series
used by Du and Hayes. We deﬂate by the urban consumer price index (CPI).
8In the 12 years leading up to the period shown in Figure 5, the national average real crack spread was
quite similar to its values between 1995 and 2004; it ranged between 30 and 50 cents and averaged 35 cents.
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Figure 5: Real crack spread over time (per gallon)
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operating costs and recuperate their investments in capital, but low enough not to encourage
entry. Figure 5 illustrates that the crack spread is currently very low and reﬁneries are
exiting; the number of operating reﬁneries fell from 146 in 2008 to 137 in 2011. The exit of
reﬁneries will, in time, put upward pressure on gasoline prices and increase the proﬁtability
of remaining reﬁneries. Thus, even if ethanol contributed to a low recent reﬁning margin,
this eﬀect will not persist.
The long-run bounds on the reﬁning margin do not necessarily hold for short-term ﬂuc-
tuations in proﬁtability. In the short run, for example within a given month or two, gasoline
prices can rise considerably and not attract entry if the rise is believed to be temporary;
similarly, gasoline prices might fall considerably and not lead to exit. This is, perhaps, best
illustrated by the seasonal ﬂuctuations of gasoline prices. Figure 5 illustrates that each sum-
mer, the crack spread increases as capacity constraints for reﬁned products are more likely
to bind. From 1995 to 2011, the average December crack spread in real terms was 34 cents,
but the average May crack spread was 49 cents.
Crack spreads and ratios still have a lower bound in the short run, however. There is a
short-run lower bound driven by the proﬁt maximizing condition that the value of reﬁned
products must exceed short-run average variable costs, which include the price of crude oil.
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If prices for reﬁned products fall too low, reﬁneries will temporarily close. There is also a
short-run upper bound driven by the cost of importing reﬁned product from outside of the
geographical area.
Ethanol production could aﬀect the reﬁning margin in the short run if it arrives when
reﬁneries are producing at capacity. High gasoline demand can cause reﬁneries to hit capacity
constraints, which in turn increases the reﬁning margin. If more ethanol were made available
to the market at such a time, then capacity constraints would be relieved, the reﬁning
margin would decrease and gasoline prices would decline. Without ethanol, gasoline prices
would still have declined in the longer run as more reﬁning capacity was built or gasoline
imports increased. The eﬀect of ethanol in this scenario is only to speed up the price decline.
Alternatively, if the reﬁning industry has market power, then ethanol production can increase
the elasticity of the residual-demand curve faced by reﬁners. This would, in turn, reduce
market power and gasoline prices in the short run.
Du and Hayes appear to ignore the short- and long-run distinction. Their regression
models control for some factors that may aﬀect reﬁnery proﬁtability in the short-run, such
as inventories and capacity utilization, but they make no mention of the length of run in
their discussion of the eﬀects of ethanol production. As an example, suppose the Du and
Hayes regression results are true—ethanol production decreased gasoline prices by 89 cents
per gallon in 2010. Eliminating all ethanol would have increased the average crack spread
from 39 cents to $1.28 cents in 2010; the May average across PADDs would have been $1.37.
This is 20 cents higher than the highest crack spread ever observed in the data. For this
to be a long-run eﬀect—which is the implicit assumption in the RFA’s claims—we would
have to expect that these historic high crack spreads would not increase capacity utilization.
According to the EIA, reﬁnery capacity utilization averaged 86.4% in 2010, which is lower
than every year from 1992-2007.9 Even if this idle capacity could not be utilized for gasoline
production, new reﬁning capacity would quickly be attracted by such massive proﬁt margins.
We next discuss several choices a researcher must make in order to estimate the relation-
ship between gasoline prices and ethanol production and how they relate to the discussion
above.
3 Issues Related to Model Speciﬁcation
The empirical models in Du and Hayes use monthly PADD-level data on either the crack
ratio or the crack spread and include several covariates. The key covariate is the monthly
production of ethanol in the US. The other covariates are: the PADD-level stock of oil
9See http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_unc_dcu_nus_a.htm
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and gasoline reserves; PADD-level reﬁning capacity; PADD-level gasoline imports; PADD-
level Hirschman-Herﬁndahl Index for reﬁning concentration; a dummy variable for supply
disruptions; and a set of month and PADD ﬁxed eﬀects. They include all dependent and
independent variables in levels in an ordinary least squares regression.10
3.1 Time Horizon and Trend
The ﬁrst decision a researcher must make if she is interested in estimating the impact of
ethanol production on gasoline prices is: “what time horizon am I interested in”? For
example, she could ask what would happen to gasoline prices over the course of the next
month if ethanol suddenly vanished from the market. This horizon, however, is of very
little policy relevance. Policies seek to increase ethanol production over the course of years,
having very little impact in any one month. For example, the renewable fuel standard
slowly increases ethanol requirements over a 10-year period and says little about what should
happen in any one month.
Figure 5 shows that ethanol production increased smoothly during the 11-year sample
period, with the exception of a downward blip following the ﬁnancial crisis in the fall of
2008. This trend causes ethanol production to be strongly correlated with any variable that
increased or decreased during the same period, especially if that variable also experienced a
blip during the ﬁnancial crisis. These patterns present an empirical challenge. To rule out
omitted variables bias due to coincidental trends, the researcher must control for the trend
or, equivalently, detrend the data. However, once the data are detrended, only short-run
ﬂuctuations remain, so the researcher is locked into studying the short run.
The discussion in Section 2 can help resolve these issues. In the long run, the crack spread
is driven by changes in oil reﬁning technology, the cost of capital, and average operating costs.
Controlling for these factors reduces the chance of obtaining spurious results due to coincident
trends. In particular, we show in Section 6 that using the prices of crude oil and natural gas
to control for the energy cost of reﬁning dramatically reduces the estimated eﬀect of ethanol
on the crack spread and crack ratio. Du and Hayes do not use such controls. Moreover, they
focus their analysis on the crack ratio rather than the crack spread. Figure 6 plots the crack
ratio in each PADD over time, along with US ethanol production. It shows that the crack
ratio has steadily fallen, which suggests that the crack ratio may be particularly susceptible
to generating spurious results due to coincident trends.
10Du and Hayes (2009) uses an instrumental variables approach for gasoline imports. However, the numbers
cited by the RFA and Secretary Vilsack are based on Du and Hayes (2011) and Du and Hayes (2012) which
explicitly say the authors estimate the model using ordinary least squares (page 3 in both papers).
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Figure 6: Crack ratio and ethanol production over time
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3.2 Choice of Dependent Variable
Du and Hayes calculate the change in gasoline prices from eliminating ethanol using their
results from the crack ratio regression; they do not show the calculation for their crack spread
results. This is a curious choice. Proﬁtability of a reﬁnery depends on the diﬀerence between
the prices of the various reﬁned products and the costs of production, which are dominated
by the price of crude oil. Therefore if ethanol production reduces reﬁnery margins, then
it will operate through a reduction in the diﬀerence between gasoline and oil prices, not a
proportional change in gasoline prices relative to oil prices, as the crack ratio model requires.
Put diﬀerently, the crack ratio model requires that if oil prices increase by 20 percent,
all else equal, gasoline prices should also increase by 20 percent. If this were true, however,
the proﬁtability of reﬁneries would increase. To see this, suppose the price of oil is $2.00 per
gallon and the price of gasoline is $2.40 implying a crack spread of 40 cents and a crack ratio
of 1.2. Suppose the energy-cost of reﬁning is $0.10 per gallon. Ignoring the non-energy and
non-raw-material costs of reﬁning, reﬁneries earn 30 cents per gallon of producer surplus.
Now suppose the price of oil increases to $4.00 and the energy-cost of reﬁning to $0.20 per
gallon. If nothing else changes, the crack ratio model would imply that the price of gasoline
10
Figure 7: Crack ratio versus the real price of oil (per barrel)
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would increase to $4.80. Reﬁneries would now earn 60 cents per gallon in producer surplus
(again ignoring other costs). However, if the marginal reﬁnery was just breaking even when
oil prices were $2.00, we would now expect to see entry, because this marginal reﬁnery would
now be earning a positive economic proﬁt.
This discussion suggests a negative relationship between the crack ratio and oil prices, all
else equal. Du and Hayes make the implicit assumption that the crack ratio is independent
of the price of oil. The above discussion and the data contradict this. Figure 7 is a scatter
plot of the crack ratio and oil prices. There is a strong negative relationship; when oil prices
increase, the crack ratio falls.11
By not controlling for the price of oil in their crack ratio empirical models, Du and Hayes
likely overstate the impact of ethanol on gasoline prices. Over their sample, both oil prices
and ethanol production increased; the simple correlation between the two variables is 0.73.
In a model of the crack ratio that omits the price of oil, the estimated ethanol eﬀect captures
both a portion of the oil-price eﬀect and any ethanol eﬀect that may or may not exist.
11The simple correlation is -0.67.
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Figure 8: The price of oil and the Energy Sector PPI over time
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3.3 Controlling for Inﬂation
Because the data used in the analysis cover at least 10 years, the crack spread should be
deﬂated to control for inﬂation—the overall change in prices over the time period. Deﬂating
prices is important because $100 in 2000 is worth less than $100 in 2010 because it is able to
buy less of a given basket of goods. Du and Hayes choose to deﬂate prices by the producer
price index (PPI) for crude energy material, which measures changes in energy prices over
time. The authors do not discuss their choice, but refer to their deﬂated crack spread as the
“real crack spread”, suggesting that their goal is to account for inﬂation—again, the overall
change in prices over time. Deﬂating by the PPI for crude energy material does not do this
and makes their crack spread measure very close to the crack ratio.
Figure 8 plots both the crude energy PPI and the price of oil both scaled so that they
begin at one and reveals their close relationship. Therefore, by deﬂating the crack spread by
the crude energy PPI essentially divides the crack spread by the price of oil. This leads to
the following:
pricegas − priceoil
Energy PPI
≈ pricegas − priceoil
priceoil
=
pricegas
priceoil
− 1 = crack ratio− 1 (2)
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Figure 9: Scatterplot of the monthly crack spread versus monthly ethanol production
deﬂating by the Energy Sector PPI
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We show in Section 6 that this assumption increases the estimated eﬀect of ethanol on
gasoline prices. The foundation underlying this result can be seen in two simple scatter plots.
Figure 9 is a scatterplot of the PADD-level monthly crack spread, deﬂated by the PPI for
crude energy material, and US ethanol production. Also plotted are three ﬁtted bivariate
relationships: a linear model, a quadratic model, and a log-log model. When deﬂating by
essentially the price of oil, there is a consistent negative relationship between the crack
spread and ethanol production. Figure 10, in contrast, deﬂates by a general urban consumer
price index (CPI). The negative relationship breaks down. Indeed, for the linear and log-log
bivariate models, there is a positive relationship.
3.4 Linearity Assumption
The Du and Hayes empirical speciﬁcation assumes that a one million barrel increase in
ethanol production has the same eﬀect on either the crack ratio or crack spread regardless
of whether current ethanol production is 3 million barrels or 28 million barrels per month
(roughly the range in the data) and regardless of the current level of the dependent variable.
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Figure 10: Scatterplot of the monthly deﬂated crack spread versus monthly ethanol
production deﬂating by the Urban CPI
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While we do not investigate the robustness of the results to this assumption, we note that
because of both short- and long-run constraints on the proﬁtability of reﬁneries, such a linear
assumption could not hold forever.
3.5 Dynamics
The crack ratio and crack spread display signiﬁcant autocorrelation. For example, the ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation in the CPI-deﬂated real crack spread ranges from 0.77 to 0.83 across
the ﬁve PADDs. Much of this autocorrelation remains in the residuals after estimating
the various models, which implies that the models do not capture the dynamics of the
reﬁning margin. Adding a lag of the dependent variable to the models would absorb this
autocorrelation and could be motivated by adjustment costs. Borenstein and Shepard (2002)
show that gasoline prices take several weeks to adjust to oil price shocks due to the cost of
adjusting reﬁnery production and the cost of gasoline storage.
A dynamic analysis of the eﬀects of ethanol production and the reﬁning margin would
require a model of expectations. The industry anticipated the rate of expansion of ethanol
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capacity, because it was published in the RFS. Coupled with an anticipated eﬀect of ethanol
on gasoline prices, this expectation would lead reﬁners to reduce the amount of gasoline
in storage, which would cause the reﬁning margin to decline before ethanol production in-
creased. We see a full dynamic analysis of this problem as beyond the scope of these data.
Nonetheless, we report results from models that include a lagged dependent variable.
Including a dynamic component such as a lagged dependent variable in the regression
model, implies that the eﬀect of ethanol production is also dynamic. The coeﬃcient on
ethanol production represents the contemporaneous response of the reﬁning margin to an
unanticipated ethanol production increase. Because of the adjustment costs, the margin
would respond more in the next period and each period thereafter as it asymptotes to the
new long-run equilibrium. This narrative contradicts the basic economics outlined in Section
2, namely that ethanol production would not have a long-run eﬀect on the reﬁning margin.
We would expect any short-run eﬀect to dissipate over time. Thus, although we may interpret
the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable as capturing partial adjustment to oil price
shocks, we would not assert that ethanol production increases should have the same dynamic
eﬀect.
3.6 Standard Errors
Du and Hayes estimate some models using a panel that includes monthly time series data
for each of the ﬁve PADDs. They also estimate separate models for each PADD. These
data are not distributed independently across observations, so correct inference requires the
use of robust standard errors. Two dimensions of dependence exist in the data. First, as
noted in Sections 3.1 and 3.5, ethanol production and the regression errors are strongly
autocorrelated. If these variables exceed their mean in one month, they are likely to exceed
their mean in the next month. Second, gasoline prices are strongly correlated across PADDs
in the same month. Figures 5 and 6 show that, if the crack ratio or spread exceeds its mean
in one PADD this month, then it is likely to exceed its mean in all PADDs this month.
These correlations imply that the data cannot be treated as though each observation
brings independent information. It is particularly important to use robust standard errors
when both the regression residuals and the covariates exhibit strong correlation. In the cross-
sectional dimension, ethanol production is identical across PADDs because Du and Hayes
use national ethanol production as the explanatory variable. In the time series dimension,
ethanol production appears to have a unit root. Using the Dickey Fuller, Dickey Fuller GLS,
and the Phillips-Perron unit root tests, both including and not including a trend, we are
unable to reject the unit-root null hypothesis. Unit-root test resuls for the crack ratio and
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crack spread are more mixed; some tests reject the null of a unit root, but others do not.
Extreme correlations in ethanol production in both of time-series and cross-sectional di-
mensions imply that correct standard errors are likely much larger than the default estimates
produced by a standard regression package (Moulton (1990)). We use the Newey-West es-
timator with 12 lags and cluster across PADDs.12 Each of these steps reduces the standard
error by about half. Put another way, each of these steps doubles the width of conﬁdence
intervals on the eﬀect of ethanol on gasoline production. Du and Hayes appear to recognize
the need to account for time series dependence; they report using the “bw” option in STATA
to construct Newey-West standard error estimates. They do not state how many lags they
use, nor do they appear to cluster across PADDs.
4 Model Speciﬁcations
We begin by estimating the empirical speciﬁcations reported in Du and Hayes (2011) and Du
and Hayes (2012) for both the crack ratio and the deﬂated crack spread. The full results are
reported in the Appendix. We believe we replicate their results quite well; diﬀerences may
be the result of minor diﬀerences in the data collection methods and how missing data are
treated (discussed in more detail below). We then present the results from several alternative
empirical speciﬁcations that address the issues discussed above.
For the models using the crack ratio as the dependent variable, we estimate the following
speciﬁcations:
1. The Du and Hayes speciﬁcation.
2. Adding the real price of oil as an explanatory variable.
3. Adding the real prices of oil and natural gas as explanatory variables.
4. Adding the real prices of oil and natural gas and the lagged dependent variable as
explanatory variables.
For the models using the deﬂated crack spread as the dependent variable, we estimate
the following speciﬁcations:
1. Deﬂating using the Producer Price Index for crude energy material (the Du and Hayes
speciﬁcation).
12We implement this using the ivreg2 command in STATA with the bw and cluster options. Increasing
the number of lags to 24 makes no diﬀerence to the estimates.
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2. Deﬂating using the Consumer Price Index.
3. Deﬂating using the Consumer Price Index and adding the price of oil.
4. Deﬂating using the Consumer Price Index and adding the price of oil and the price of
natural gas.
5. Deﬂating using the Consumer Price Index and adding the price of oil, the price of
natural gas, and the lagged dependent variable.
5 Data
We followed Du and Hayes (2009), Du and Hayes (2011), and Du and Hayes (2012) in
the collection of the data used in our analysis. See our respective websites for the data,
links to websites where the data were collected, information on how certain variables were
constructed, and the computer code to generate the results. We rescale our data so that the
ﬁrst four digits after the decimal points of the regression coeﬃcients are informative.
The gasoline price variable is the total gasoline wholesale/resale price by reﬁners, which
excludes taxes and is mostly reﬂects gasoline prior to blending with ethanol. The crude oil
price is the national average reﬁner acquisition cost of crude oil. PADD-speciﬁc crude oil
acquisition costs exist only back to 2004, which presumably is why Du and Hayes use the
national series.
As in Du and Hayes (2011), our sample begins in January 2000 and goes through the
end of 2010. One of the covariates that Du and Hayes employs is PADD-level gasoline
imports. These data are collected from the Energy Information Administration website and
are missing for a number of time periods. Du and Hayes do not discuss what they do with
these missing observations, but we suspect that they impute the missing observations in some
way. In what follows, we replace the missing observations with the PADD-level average for
that month of year. We have found that omitting these observations from the analysis can
have large eﬀects on the estimated coeﬃcients. However, omitting these observations does
not alter our conclusion that the eﬀect of ethanol production on gasoline prices is not robust
and empirical speciﬁcations that consider the basic economics of the industry yield much
smaller eﬀects than those cited by the RFA and Secretary Vilsack.
6 Results
Figure 11 presents the estimated eﬀects from eliminating ethanol for 2010 using the method
of Du and Hayes and the pooled-sample estimates, which we also show in Table 1. We
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Figure 11: Implied gasoline price eﬀects from elimination of ethanol for 2010
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Note: Details of model speciﬁcations in Section 4. The vertical lines denote 95% conﬁdence
intervals. The large square indicates the results obtained from the Du and Hayes model.
discuss the PADD-level results in Section 6.2. The large square in Figure 11 shows the
estimate from the model favored by Du and Hayes. This model uses the crack ratio as the
dependent variable and produces an estimated price eﬀect $0.86 per gallon. We argue in
Section 2 that the crack ratio speciﬁcation is ﬂawed because it imposes that the long-run
reﬁning margin is constant as a proportion of oil prices. Therefore, we focus on models that
use the crack spread as the dependent variable.13
Du and Hayes never present the estimated eﬀect of ethanol production on gasoline prices
from their crack spread models. We calculate the ethanol eﬀect from the crack spread
models as the implied increase in the crack spread from eliminating all ethanol production.14
13The results for the expanded set of crack ratio models are presented in Table 1 and reported graphically
in Figure 15 in the Appendix. The underlying regression results are shown in Appendix Tables 3 and 4.
These expanded crack ratio models suggest that, once oil and natural gas prices and the lagged crack ratio are
controlled for, the eﬀect of ethanol is statistically insigniﬁcant. We note that including higher order terms for
oil and natural gas prices further decreases the estimated eﬀects when using the crack ratio models. Because
we put little weight on the crack ratio models, we omit these results.
14Speciﬁcally, we take average 2010 ethanol production of 26.38 million barrels per month and multiply it
by the relevant regression coeﬃcient on ethanol production, which we show in Table 3. This calculation is
the direct analog to those made by Du and Hayes for the crack ratio.
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Table 1: Implied gasoline price eﬀects from elimination of ethanol for 2010
Model
Reduction in Gasoline Prices from 
Eliminating All Ethanol
Statistically 
Significant?
Crack Spread
Du and Hayes Model (unreported) -$0.12  Yes
Du and Hayes Model using CPI to Deflate -$0.09 No
CPI to Deflate and Price of Oil -$0.30  Yes
CPI to Deflate, Price of Oil, and Price of NG -$0.13 No
CPI to Deflate, Price of Oil, Price of NG, and Lagged 
Dependent Variable -$0.09 No
Crack Ratio
Du and Hayes Model -$0.86  Yes
Adding Price of Oil -$0.48  Yes
Adding Price of Oil and Price of NG -$0.35  Yes
Adding Price of Oil, Price of NG, and Lagged Dependent 
Variable -$0.12 No
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance at 5%.
We then assume that gasoline prices rise by this amount, based on the notion expressed
in Section 2 that ethanol reduces the reﬁning margin by relaxing capacity constraints and
thereby reduces the prices of the reﬁned products.
Figure 11 shows that the Du-Hayes crack-spread model produces an estimated ethanol
eﬀect of just $0.12 per gallon, a small fraction of the $0.89 estimate trumpeted by the RFA.
The estimate drops further to $0.09 per gallon and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant when
we deﬂate by the CPI, which is much more defensible than the PPI for crude energy material
deﬂator that Du and Hayes use. When we control for the energy costs of reﬁning using oil
and natural gas prices, the estimated eﬀect is $0.13 and statistically insigniﬁcant. Finally,
the model that includes a lagged dependent variable produces the smallest estimated impact
is also statistically insigniﬁcant.
We hesitate to endorse any of these models. We only claim that the number reported by
the RFA and Secretary Vilsack is (a) inconsistent with the basic economics of the industry, (b)
at the high end of the distribution of possible estimates, and (c) outside of the distribution of
estimates one obtains when taking the economics of the industry seriously. The smoothness
of the ethanol production variable means that it is easily conﬂated with other trends in the
data. We eliminate some of these trends by controlling for the energy cost of reﬁning using
oil and natural gas prices. Doing so reduces the estimated eﬀect to statistically insigniﬁcant
amounts of $0.13 in the crack-spread model. We see these results as representing the most
plausible eﬀects, conditional on the modeling approach. However, as we note in Section
2, this modeling approach does not separate the short- and long-run eﬀects, so it is not
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Figure 12: Implied PADD-level gasoline price eﬀects from elimination of ethanol for 2010
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Note: Details of model speciﬁcations in Section 4. The share of statistical signiﬁcance is
based on a 5% signiﬁcance level for each PADD.
surprising that the eﬀect is small. The next two pieces of evidence highlight the diﬃculty of
estimating the true impact of ethanol on gasoline prices with these data.
6.1 Additional Evidence: PADD-speciﬁc eﬀects
Table 2 shows that the PADD-level results exhibit similar variation.15 Figure 12 graphs the
implied eﬀect on gas prices. Using the exact Du and Hayes model implies ethanol reduces
gasoline prices by an average $0.81 cents. Like in Figure 11, the models based on the crack
spread produce smaller average eﬀects.
15For the underlying regression estimates, see Appendix Tables 5 through 14.
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Figure 13: Implied gasoline price diﬀerence between PADDs 2 and 3 from the Du and
Hayes model following the elimination of ethanol in 2010
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
PA
D
D
 2
 G
as
 P
ric
e 
- P
AD
D
 3
 G
as
 P
ric
e 
 ($
/ga
l)
2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1
Date
Observed PADD 2 and 3 Price Difference
Implied PADD 2 and 3 Price Difference from Du and Hayes Model
The PADD-level results provide for an additional reality check of the empirical results.
PADDs are areas of the country that are connected by oil and gasoline pipelines. Figure 4
maps the ﬁve PADDs. While gasoline pipeline capacity constraints sometimes generate price
diﬀerences across PADDs, certain PADDs are well integrated. This integration is illustrated
in Borenstein and Kellogg (2012), which shows that lower crude prices in the Midwest (PADD
2) do not translate into lower gasoline prices in the Midwest because the gasoline pipeline
network arbitrages any potential gasoline price diﬀerence.
This market integration makes the stark diﬀerence in the ethanol eﬀects across PADDs
puzzling. Using the Du-Hayes speciﬁcation, the price decline in PADD 2 is estimated to be
$1.49, while the eﬀect in PADD 1 is 54 cents. A similar diﬀerence exists between PADDs 2
and 3 despite the fact that reﬁned product in PADD 2 is currently being piped to PADD 3.
To illustrate that these price-eﬀect diﬀerences are implausible, Figure 13 plots the implied
price diﬀerence between PADDs 2 and 3 from the Du and Hayes crack-ratio model following
the elimination of ethanol in 2010, as well as the observed price diﬀerence. The largest
observed price diﬀerence between the two PADDs is 26 cents, yet the predicted Du and
Hayes price diﬀerence exceeds 80 cents in every month.
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6.2 Additional Evidence: Implied Eﬀects on Unrelated Variables
Next, we estimate the same models for the crack ratio and crack spread, but replace these
dependent variable with both the price of natural gas and the rate of national unemployment
for both the US and Europe. This analysis forms a “placebo test” because we know natural
gas prices and unemployment are unaﬀected by US ethanol production.
We ﬁrst present results for three placebo variables: US wellhead natural gas prices, US
unemployment, and unemployment in Europe. Appendix Table 15 presents the empirical
results using the same models discussed above, the ﬁrst of which is the same model used in
Du and Hayes (2011) and Du and Hayes (2012) to calculate the impact of ethanol production
on gasoline prices, replacing the dependent variable with US natural gas prices. These results
suggest that ethanol production “causes” reductions in natural gas prices. The estimated
eﬀects are large. For example, using the same model used in Du and Hayes, had we eliminated
ethanol in 2010, natural gas prices would have increased by 65 percent. These results are
robust to the alternative speciﬁcations we suggest above.
Appendix Table 16 replaces the crack ratio with US national unemployment. These
results suggest that US ethanol production “causes” increases in unemployment. Again the
implied eﬀect is large; eliminating ethanol production in 2010 would have decreased US
unemployment by 65 percent. These results are also robust to the alternative speciﬁcations
we present above for the crack ratio and the crack spread. Should we therefore doubt the
RFA’s claims on its website that ethanol creates jobs?
Appendix Table 17 replaces the crack ratio with unemployment rates in France, the UK,
Italy and all of the European Union. We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects for France, the
UK, and the EU. While the eﬀects in France and the EU are more modest—eliminating
ethanol in 2010 would have decreased unemployment by 7 and 12 percent, respectively—the
eﬀect in the UK is large; eliminating ethanol in 2010 would have decreased unemployment
by 42 percent.
These empirical relationships are a classic example of spurious correlation. Ethanol
production during this time period is increasing. Therefore, other variables that have a
predominant trend, either upward in the case of unemployment or downward in the case of
natural gas prices, are likely to correlate well with ethanol production. Figure 14 illustrates
this correlation for unemployment and ethanol production.
Finally, in case there are any doubts that ethanol production does not impact unem-
ployment in the US and Europe, we oﬀer a whimsical example. Appendix Table 18 replaces
the crack ratio with the age of our eldest children (Caiden Knittel and Hayley Smith). The
results suggest every million barrels of ethanol increases Caiden’s age by just under 26 days.
Ethanol has an even larger aﬀect on Hayley’s age, with every million barrels increasing her
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Figure 14: Scatterplot of US, EU, and UK National Unemployment and US Ethanol
Production
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age by nearly two months. Eliminating all ethanol in 2010 is estimated to cause Caiden to
be a newborn (12 days old) and would cause Hayley’s age to be negative. These results are
statistically signiﬁcant and remain roughly the same size and statistically signiﬁcant if we
include oil and natural gas prices as covariates. These results underscore danger of drawing
causal inference from two variables exhibiting trends: age and ethanol production. Gasoline
prices, crack ratios, and crack spreads also exhibited trends during this time period as shown,
for example, in Figures 5 and 6. Taken together, our results suggest strongly that results
reported in Du and Hayes (2011) and Du and Hayes (2012) are spurious.
7 Conclusions
Understanding the relationship between ethanol production and gasoline prices is impor-
tant. The US has historically subsidized ethanol production and capacity expansion explic-
itly through the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) and capacity subsidies
and implicitly through policies such as the Renewable Fuel Standard and state-level blend
mandates. The beneﬁts of ethanol, relative to gasoline, are that it diversiﬁes our fuel mix,
can have lower emissions, and increases farmer wealth. An additional, potential, beneﬁt is
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that it may decrease the price of gasoline by relieving reﬁning capacity constraints.
While the VEETC recently expired, policies that support ethanol production continue
to be ubiquitous, and there are calls for a national policy that would require blending 15
percent ethanol with gasoline. Accurate cost/beneﬁt analysis of policies such as these re-
quires understanding whether the potential beneﬁts listed above exist, and, if they do, their
magnitudes. The Renewable Fuel Association continues to make claims regarding the eﬀect
of ethanol on gasoline prices. They claim that ethanol production decreased gasoline prices
by an average of 89 cents per gallon and $1.09 per gallon in 2010 and 2011, respectively. We
investigate the accuracy of this claim. We show that their results are driven by implausible
economic assumptions and spurious statistical correlations. In doing so, we show that the
empirical results are extremely sensitive to the empirical speciﬁcation; however, empirical
models that are most consistent with economic theory suggest eﬀects that are near zero and
statistically insigniﬁcant.
We also show that the empirical results behind the RFA’s claims are driven by spurious
correlation: over the sample period crack spreads and crack ratios fell while ethanol produc-
tion increased. To illustrate the danger of inferring causal relationships between gasoline
prices and ethanol production, we estimate the same models used in Du and Hayes (2011)
and Du and Hayes (2012) and replace the crack ratio with natural gas prices, US unem-
ployment, and European unemployment. We ﬁnd that ethanol production “causes” lower
natural gas prices and higher unemployment rates in both the US and Europe.
More important than our empirical work, however, is our discussion of the basic economics
of the industry. The results of Du and Hayes are at odds with the historical levels of either
the crack spread or crack ratio and are inconsistent with an equilibrium in the oil reﬁning
industry. While an instantaneous surprise elimination of all ethanol sold in the US might
raise gasoline prices for a short time period, one cannot assume these instantaneous eﬀects
would persist for more than a few weeks. This is precisely what Du, Hayes, the RFA, and
Secretary Vilsack have done.
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A Appendix — Full Empirical Results
Figure 15: Implied gasoline price eﬀects from elimination of ethanol for 2010 with
expanded crack ratio models
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Note: Details of model speciﬁcations in Section 4. The vertical lines denote 95% conﬁdence
intervals. The large square indicates the results obtained from the Du and Hayes model.
27
Table 3: Deﬂated Crack Spread Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real Crack Spread
Real Crack Spread w/CPI
Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price
Real Crack Spread Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH w/ CPI oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0047*** -0.0033 -0.0112*** -0.0049 -0.0032
(0.0008) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0021)
Real Price of Oil 0.0038*** 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0008)
Natural Gas Price 0.0329*** 0.0040
(0.0101) (0.0082)
Lagged Real Crack Spread 0.6696***
(0.0551)
Gasoline Imports -0.0028*** 0.0047* 0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0011)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0017*** -0.0003 0.0019** 0.0024*** 0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0003)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0009 -0.0120*** -0.0092*** -0.0071** -0.0059***
(0.0016) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0014)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity 0.0027* 0.0263*** 0.0165*** 0.0122*** 0.0064***
(0.0016) (0.0056) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0016)
PADD HHI 0.3883*** 2.3653*** 1.5468*** 1.2297** 0.3259*
(0.1343) (0.5332) (0.4378) (0.4782) (0.1675)
Hurricane 0.0066 0.3383*** 0.2994*** 0.1710*** 0.1635***
(0.0142) (0.0257) (0.0203) (0.0435) (0.0368)
January -0.0041 0.0111 0.0052 0.0139 0.0442***
(0.0109) (0.0173) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0114)
February 0.0105 0.0304* 0.0129 0.0380* 0.0511***
(0.0129) (0.0168) (0.0178) (0.0221) (0.0137)
March 0.0323*** 0.0742*** 0.0551*** 0.0813*** 0.0835***
(0.0123) (0.0184) (0.0199) (0.0183) (0.0227)
April 0.0588*** 0.1320*** 0.1021*** 0.1418*** 0.1009***
(0.0168) (0.0251) (0.0276) (0.0270) (0.0197)
May 0.0700*** 0.1671*** 0.1359*** 0.1702*** 0.0913***
(0.0199) (0.0370) (0.0395) (0.0382) (0.0222)
June 0.0511*** 0.1299*** 0.0880*** 0.1265*** 0.0293**
(0.0167) (0.0273) (0.0284) (0.0315) (0.0129)
July 0.0322** 0.0752*** 0.0365* 0.0776*** 0.0054
(0.0140) (0.0211) (0.0218) (0.0235) (0.0145)
August 0.0442*** 0.0726*** 0.0424* 0.0979*** 0.0477***
(0.0121) (0.0236) (0.0219) (0.0174) (0.0158)
September 0.0588*** 0.0699** 0.0477* 0.1131*** 0.0482
(0.0161) (0.0312) (0.0273) (0.0324) (0.0342)
October 0.0453*** 0.0247 0.0120 0.0656** -0.0069
(0.0150) (0.0243) (0.0225) (0.0258) (0.0240)
November 0.0121** 0.0224** 0.0112 0.0320** -0.0075
(0.0059) (0.0112) (0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0256)
PADD II -0.1148*** -0.0809 -0.1865** -0.2052*** -0.1181***
(0.0340) (0.0974) (0.0743) (0.0711) (0.0397)
PADD III -0.3866*** -0.8325*** -0.8491*** -0.8021*** -0.3181***
(0.0850) (0.2983) (0.2175) (0.2046) (0.0800)
PADD IV 0.0250 -0.0171 -0.0880 -0.0735 -0.2047***
(0.0651) (0.1538) (0.1358) (0.1244) (0.0765)
PADD V -0.0450 -0.1632 -0.2018* -0.1788* -0.1780***
(0.0506) (0.1281) (0.1101) (0.1058) (0.0621)
Constant 0.1697** 0.2228 0.2632* 0.1233 0.2529***
(0.0708) (0.1676) (0.1357) (0.1229) (0.0954)
Observations 660 660 660 660 655
R-squared 0.5245 0.4792 0.5871 0.6297 0.8158
28
Table 4: Crack Ratio Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crack Ratio
Crack Ratio oil price
Crack Ratio Crack Ratio oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0178*** -0.0100*** -0.0073*** -0.0025*
(0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0015)
Real Price of Oil -0.0038*** -0.0049*** -0.0022***
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0145 0.0069
(0.0104) (0.0075)
Lagged Crack Ratio 0.5970***
(0.0422)
Gasoline Imports -0.0070*** -0.0026 -0.0036** -0.0023***
(0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0009)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0035** 0.0014** 0.0016** 0.0006
(0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves 0.0000 -0.0028 -0.0018 -0.0046***
(0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0012)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -0.0002 0.0096*** 0.0078*** 0.0048***
(0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0015)
PADD HHI -0.1868 0.6283** 0.4888* 0.1166
(0.2652) (0.2742) (0.2590) (0.1298)
Hurricane 0.0896*** 0.1284*** 0.0719 0.0560
(0.0289) (0.0250) (0.0487) (0.0383)
January 0.0048 0.0107 0.0145 0.0489***
(0.0258) (0.0236) (0.0228) (0.0143)
February 0.0108 0.0282 0.0393 0.0479***
(0.0295) (0.0253) (0.0271) (0.0175)
March 0.0766*** 0.0956*** 0.1072*** 0.0879***
(0.0284) (0.0214) (0.0234) (0.0275)
April 0.1306*** 0.1604*** 0.1779*** 0.1231***
(0.0412) (0.0332) (0.0361) (0.0277)
May 0.1633*** 0.1943*** 0.2094*** 0.1105***
(0.0461) (0.0403) (0.0425) (0.0222)
June 0.1076*** 0.1493*** 0.1663*** 0.0500**
(0.0317) (0.0266) (0.0308) (0.0235)
July 0.0608*** 0.0993*** 0.1173*** 0.0242
(0.0233) (0.0213) (0.0237) (0.0205)
August 0.0628*** 0.0929*** 0.1173*** 0.0515*
(0.0240) (0.0263) (0.0278) (0.0277)
September 0.0694** 0.0915** 0.1203*** 0.0659**
(0.0332) (0.0372) (0.0393) (0.0299)
October 0.0313 0.0439* 0.0675** 0.0048
(0.0231) (0.0242) (0.0296) (0.0253)
November 0.0077 0.0189 0.0280 0.0017
(0.0177) (0.0152) (0.0179) (0.0239)
PADD II -0.2800*** -0.1749*** -0.1831*** -0.1342***
(0.0874) (0.0562) (0.0517) (0.0294)
PADD III -0.6675*** -0.6510*** -0.6303*** -0.3176***
(0.2149) (0.1091) (0.1069) (0.0492)
PADD IV -0.0541 0.0165 0.0230 -0.1915***
(0.1345) (0.1158) (0.1174) (0.0628)
PADD V -0.0838 -0.0454 -0.0353 -0.1477***
(0.0996) (0.0839) (0.0814) (0.0469)
Constant 1.5678*** 1.5276*** 1.4660*** 0.8051***
(0.1532) (0.1380) (0.1522) (0.0862)
Observations 660 660 660 655
R-squared 0.6623 0.7462 0.7527 0.8434
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Table 5: Crack Ratio Results PADD I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crack Ratio
Crack Ratio oil price
Crack Ratio Crack Ratio oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0109** -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0025
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0021)
Real Price of Oil -0.0037*** -0.0044*** -0.0023***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0093 0.0069
(0.0083) (0.0055)
Lagged Crack Ratio 0.5269***
(0.0707)
Gasoline Imports -0.0030 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0023
(0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0027)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0048 0.0023 0.0003 -0.0030
(0.0071) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0045)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0068** -0.0100*** -0.0095*** -0.0077***
(0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0017)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -0.0207 0.0008 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0081)
PADD HHI -1.1021 0.1659 0.1214 -0.0293
(0.9256) (0.7287) (0.7137) (0.3781)
Hurricane 0.1926** 0.1798*** 0.1560** 0.1164**
(0.0798) (0.0660) (0.0680) (0.0522)
January 0.0364 0.0382* 0.0402* 0.0507**
(0.0247) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0210)
February 0.0058 0.0196 0.0260 0.0123
(0.0335) (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0257)
March 0.0425 0.0497* 0.0603* 0.0494*
(0.0352) (0.0302) (0.0309) (0.0262)
April 0.1125*** 0.1279*** 0.1421*** 0.1075***
(0.0355) (0.0299) (0.0317) (0.0260)
May 0.1486*** 0.1700*** 0.1828*** 0.1084***
(0.0363) (0.0299) (0.0313) (0.0270)
June 0.0936** 0.1312*** 0.1434*** 0.0502*
(0.0369) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0283)
July 0.0419 0.0744** 0.0886*** 0.0241
(0.0358) (0.0300) (0.0318) (0.0267)
August 0.0008 0.0231 0.0409 0.0064
(0.0358) (0.0304) (0.0333) (0.0271)
September -0.0101 0.0091 0.0277 0.0092
(0.0355) (0.0308) (0.0341) (0.0284)
October -0.0526 -0.0476 -0.0312 -0.0490*
(0.0352) (0.0301) (0.0325) (0.0284)
November -0.0281 -0.0267 -0.0200 -0.0253
(0.0229) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0209)
Constant 2.2534*** 2.0340*** 2.0322*** 1.2363***
(0.2867) (0.2241) (0.2197) (0.1732)
Observations 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.6956 0.7922 0.7956 0.8689
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Table 6: Crack Ratio Results PADD II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crack Ratio
Crack Ratio oil price
Crack Ratio Crack Ratio oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0109** -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0025
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0021)
Real Price of Oil -0.0037*** -0.0044*** -0.0023***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0093 0.0069
(0.0083) (0.0055)
Lagged Crack Ratio 0.5269***
(0.0707)
Gasoline Imports -0.0030 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0023
(0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0027)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0048 0.0023 0.0003 -0.0030
(0.0071) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0045)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0068** -0.0100*** -0.0095*** -0.0077***
(0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0017)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -0.0207 0.0008 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0081)
PADD HHI -1.1021 0.1659 0.1214 -0.0293
(0.9256) (0.7287) (0.7137) (0.3781)
Hurricane 0.1926** 0.1798*** 0.1560** 0.1164**
(0.0798) (0.0660) (0.0680) (0.0522)
January 0.0364 0.0382* 0.0402* 0.0507**
(0.0247) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0210)
February 0.0058 0.0196 0.0260 0.0123
(0.0335) (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0257)
March 0.0425 0.0497* 0.0603* 0.0494*
(0.0352) (0.0302) (0.0309) (0.0262)
April 0.1125*** 0.1279*** 0.1421*** 0.1075***
(0.0355) (0.0299) (0.0317) (0.0260)
May 0.1486*** 0.1700*** 0.1828*** 0.1084***
(0.0363) (0.0299) (0.0313) (0.0270)
June 0.0936** 0.1312*** 0.1434*** 0.0502*
(0.0369) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0283)
July 0.0419 0.0744** 0.0886*** 0.0241
(0.0358) (0.0300) (0.0318) (0.0267)
August 0.0008 0.0231 0.0409 0.0064
(0.0358) (0.0304) (0.0333) (0.0271)
September -0.0101 0.0091 0.0277 0.0092
(0.0355) (0.0308) (0.0341) (0.0284)
October -0.0526 -0.0476 -0.0312 -0.0490*
(0.0352) (0.0301) (0.0325) (0.0284)
November -0.0281 -0.0267 -0.0200 -0.0253
(0.0229) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0209)
Constant 2.2534*** 2.0340*** 2.0322*** 1.2363***
(0.2867) (0.2241) (0.2197) (0.1732)
Observations 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.6956 0.7922 0.7956 0.8689
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Table 7: Crack Ratio Results PADD III
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crack Ratio
Crack Ratio oil price
Crack Ratio Crack Ratio oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0109** -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0025
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0021)
Real Price of Oil -0.0037*** -0.0044*** -0.0023***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0093 0.0069
(0.0083) (0.0055)
Lagged Crack Ratio 0.5269***
(0.0707)
Gasoline Imports -0.0030 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0023
(0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0027)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0048 0.0023 0.0003 -0.0030
(0.0071) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0045)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0068** -0.0100*** -0.0095*** -0.0077***
(0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0017)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -0.0207 0.0008 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0081)
PADD HHI -1.1021 0.1659 0.1214 -0.0293
(0.9256) (0.7287) (0.7137) (0.3781)
Hurricane 0.1926** 0.1798*** 0.1560** 0.1164**
(0.0798) (0.0660) (0.0680) (0.0522)
January 0.0364 0.0382* 0.0402* 0.0507**
(0.0247) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0210)
February 0.0058 0.0196 0.0260 0.0123
(0.0335) (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0257)
March 0.0425 0.0497* 0.0603* 0.0494*
(0.0352) (0.0302) (0.0309) (0.0262)
April 0.1125*** 0.1279*** 0.1421*** 0.1075***
(0.0355) (0.0299) (0.0317) (0.0260)
May 0.1486*** 0.1700*** 0.1828*** 0.1084***
(0.0363) (0.0299) (0.0313) (0.0270)
June 0.0936** 0.1312*** 0.1434*** 0.0502*
(0.0369) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0283)
July 0.0419 0.0744** 0.0886*** 0.0241
(0.0358) (0.0300) (0.0318) (0.0267)
August 0.0008 0.0231 0.0409 0.0064
(0.0358) (0.0304) (0.0333) (0.0271)
September -0.0101 0.0091 0.0277 0.0092
(0.0355) (0.0308) (0.0341) (0.0284)
October -0.0526 -0.0476 -0.0312 -0.0490*
(0.0352) (0.0301) (0.0325) (0.0284)
November -0.0281 -0.0267 -0.0200 -0.0253
(0.0229) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0209)
Constant 2.2534*** 2.0340*** 2.0322*** 1.2363***
(0.2867) (0.2241) (0.2197) (0.1732)
Observations 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.6956 0.7922 0.7956 0.8689
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Table 8: Crack Ratio Results PADD IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crack Ratio
Crack Ratio oil price
Crack Ratio Crack Ratio oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0109** -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0025
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0021)
Real Price of Oil -0.0037*** -0.0044*** -0.0023***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0093 0.0069
(0.0083) (0.0055)
Lagged Crack Ratio 0.5269***
(0.0707)
Gasoline Imports -0.0030 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0023
(0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0027)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0048 0.0023 0.0003 -0.0030
(0.0071) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0045)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0068** -0.0100*** -0.0095*** -0.0077***
(0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0017)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -0.0207 0.0008 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0081)
PADD HHI -1.1021 0.1659 0.1214 -0.0293
(0.9256) (0.7287) (0.7137) (0.3781)
Hurricane 0.1926** 0.1798*** 0.1560** 0.1164**
(0.0798) (0.0660) (0.0680) (0.0522)
January 0.0364 0.0382* 0.0402* 0.0507**
(0.0247) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0210)
February 0.0058 0.0196 0.0260 0.0123
(0.0335) (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0257)
March 0.0425 0.0497* 0.0603* 0.0494*
(0.0352) (0.0302) (0.0309) (0.0262)
April 0.1125*** 0.1279*** 0.1421*** 0.1075***
(0.0355) (0.0299) (0.0317) (0.0260)
May 0.1486*** 0.1700*** 0.1828*** 0.1084***
(0.0363) (0.0299) (0.0313) (0.0270)
June 0.0936** 0.1312*** 0.1434*** 0.0502*
(0.0369) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0283)
July 0.0419 0.0744** 0.0886*** 0.0241
(0.0358) (0.0300) (0.0318) (0.0267)
August 0.0008 0.0231 0.0409 0.0064
(0.0358) (0.0304) (0.0333) (0.0271)
September -0.0101 0.0091 0.0277 0.0092
(0.0355) (0.0308) (0.0341) (0.0284)
October -0.0526 -0.0476 -0.0312 -0.0490*
(0.0352) (0.0301) (0.0325) (0.0284)
November -0.0281 -0.0267 -0.0200 -0.0253
(0.0229) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0209)
Constant 2.2534*** 2.0340*** 2.0322*** 1.2363***
(0.2867) (0.2241) (0.2197) (0.1732)
Observations 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.6956 0.7922 0.7956 0.8689
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Table 9: Crack Ratio Results PADD V
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crack Ratio
Crack Ratio oil price
Crack Ratio Crack Ratio oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0109** -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0025
(0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0021)
Real Price of Oil -0.0037*** -0.0044*** -0.0023***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0093 0.0069
(0.0083) (0.0055)
Lagged Crack Ratio 0.5269***
(0.0707)
Gasoline Imports -0.0030 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0023
(0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0027)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0048 0.0023 0.0003 -0.0030
(0.0071) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0045)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0068** -0.0100*** -0.0095*** -0.0077***
(0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0017)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -0.0207 0.0008 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0081)
PADD HHI -1.1021 0.1659 0.1214 -0.0293
(0.9256) (0.7287) (0.7137) (0.3781)
Hurricane 0.1926** 0.1798*** 0.1560** 0.1164**
(0.0798) (0.0660) (0.0680) (0.0522)
January 0.0364 0.0382* 0.0402* 0.0507**
(0.0247) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0210)
February 0.0058 0.0196 0.0260 0.0123
(0.0335) (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0257)
March 0.0425 0.0497* 0.0603* 0.0494*
(0.0352) (0.0302) (0.0309) (0.0262)
April 0.1125*** 0.1279*** 0.1421*** 0.1075***
(0.0355) (0.0299) (0.0317) (0.0260)
May 0.1486*** 0.1700*** 0.1828*** 0.1084***
(0.0363) (0.0299) (0.0313) (0.0270)
June 0.0936** 0.1312*** 0.1434*** 0.0502*
(0.0369) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0283)
July 0.0419 0.0744** 0.0886*** 0.0241
(0.0358) (0.0300) (0.0318) (0.0267)
August 0.0008 0.0231 0.0409 0.0064
(0.0358) (0.0304) (0.0333) (0.0271)
September -0.0101 0.0091 0.0277 0.0092
(0.0355) (0.0308) (0.0341) (0.0284)
October -0.0526 -0.0476 -0.0312 -0.0490*
(0.0352) (0.0301) (0.0325) (0.0284)
November -0.0281 -0.0267 -0.0200 -0.0253
(0.0229) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0209)
Constant 2.2534*** 2.0340*** 2.0322*** 1.2363***
(0.2867) (0.2241) (0.2197) (0.1732)
Observations 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.6956 0.7922 0.7956 0.8689
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Table 10: Crack Spread Results PADD I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real Crack Spread
Real Crack Spread w/CPI
Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price
Real Crack Spread Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH w/ CPI oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0067*** -0.0057 -0.0077** -0.0069** -0.0039*
(0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0023)
Real Price of Oil 0.0012 0.0000 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0167** 0.0040
(0.0083) (0.0062)
Gasoline Imports -0.0053** 0.0042 0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0028)
Stock of Oil Reserves -0.0008 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0046)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0019 -0.0132*** -0.0123*** -0.0115*** -0.0090***
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0018)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity 0.0060 0.0427*** 0.0360** 0.0358** 0.0146
(0.0081) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0095)
PADD HHI 0.6087 3.5383*** 3.1474*** 3.0679*** 1.3910***
(0.3810) (0.7184) (0.7284) (0.6802) (0.4992)
Hurricane 0.0498 0.2480*** 0.2520*** 0.2095*** 0.1785***
(0.0360) (0.0687) (0.0676) (0.0675) (0.0523)
January 0.0030 0.0180 0.0174 0.0210 0.0310
(0.0118) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0210)
February -0.0037 -0.0088 -0.0130 -0.0015 -0.0032
(0.0153) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0246)
March 0.0145 0.0052 0.0030 0.0220 0.0239
(0.0162) (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0253)
April 0.0435*** 0.0682** 0.0635** 0.0889*** 0.0664**
(0.0168) (0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0325) (0.0265)
May 0.0569*** 0.1156*** 0.1090*** 0.1317*** 0.0798***
(0.0175) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0333) (0.0277)
June 0.0351** 0.0902*** 0.0786** 0.1004*** 0.0334
(0.0178) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0346) (0.0291)
July 0.0188 0.0278 0.0178 0.0431 -0.0048
(0.0173) (0.0322) (0.0326) (0.0337) (0.0278)
August 0.0111 -0.0195 -0.0264 0.0053 -0.0164
(0.0169) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0276)
September 0.0133 -0.0199 -0.0258 0.0075 -0.0082
(0.0162) (0.0303) (0.0301) (0.0330) (0.0277)
October 0.0044 -0.0728** -0.0744*** -0.0450 -0.0659**
(0.0160) (0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0275)
November -0.0069 -0.0386** -0.0390** -0.0270 -0.0360*
(0.0112) (0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0208)
Lagged Real Crack Spread 0.4962***
(0.0737)
Constant 0.2460** -0.0815 -0.0139 -0.0171 0.2522
(0.1228) (0.2317) (0.2279) (0.2152) (0.1537)
Observations 132 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.3647 0.7269 0.7385 0.7518 0.8290
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Table 11: Crack Spread Results PADD II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real Crack Spread
Real Crack Spread w/CPI
Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price
Real Crack Spread Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH w/ CPI oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0067*** -0.0057 -0.0077** -0.0069** -0.0039*
(0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0023)
Real Price of Oil 0.0012 0.0000 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0167** 0.0040
(0.0083) (0.0062)
Gasoline Imports -0.0053** 0.0042 0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0028)
Stock of Oil Reserves -0.0008 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0046)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0019 -0.0132*** -0.0123*** -0.0115*** -0.0090***
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0018)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity 0.0060 0.0427*** 0.0360** 0.0358** 0.0146
(0.0081) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0095)
PADD HHI 0.6087 3.5383*** 3.1474*** 3.0679*** 1.3910***
(0.3810) (0.7184) (0.7284) (0.6802) (0.4992)
Hurricane 0.0498 0.2480*** 0.2520*** 0.2095*** 0.1785***
(0.0360) (0.0687) (0.0676) (0.0675) (0.0523)
January 0.0030 0.0180 0.0174 0.0210 0.0310
(0.0118) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0210)
February -0.0037 -0.0088 -0.0130 -0.0015 -0.0032
(0.0153) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0246)
March 0.0145 0.0052 0.0030 0.0220 0.0239
(0.0162) (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0253)
April 0.0435*** 0.0682** 0.0635** 0.0889*** 0.0664**
(0.0168) (0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0325) (0.0265)
May 0.0569*** 0.1156*** 0.1090*** 0.1317*** 0.0798***
(0.0175) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0333) (0.0277)
June 0.0351** 0.0902*** 0.0786** 0.1004*** 0.0334
(0.0178) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0346) (0.0291)
July 0.0188 0.0278 0.0178 0.0431 -0.0048
(0.0173) (0.0322) (0.0326) (0.0337) (0.0278)
August 0.0111 -0.0195 -0.0264 0.0053 -0.0164
(0.0169) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0276)
September 0.0133 -0.0199 -0.0258 0.0075 -0.0082
(0.0162) (0.0303) (0.0301) (0.0330) (0.0277)
October 0.0044 -0.0728** -0.0744*** -0.0450 -0.0659**
(0.0160) (0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0275)
November -0.0069 -0.0386** -0.0390** -0.0270 -0.0360*
(0.0112) (0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0208)
Lagged Real Crack Spread 0.4962***
(0.0737)
Constant 0.2460** -0.0815 -0.0139 -0.0171 0.2522
(0.1228) (0.2317) (0.2279) (0.2152) (0.1537)
Observations 132 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.3647 0.7269 0.7385 0.7518 0.8290
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Table 12: Crack Spread Results PADD III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real Crack Spread
Real Crack Spread w/CPI
Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price
Real Crack Spread Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH w/ CPI oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0067*** -0.0057 -0.0077** -0.0069** -0.0039*
(0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0023)
Real Price of Oil 0.0012 0.0000 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0167** 0.0040
(0.0083) (0.0062)
Gasoline Imports -0.0053** 0.0042 0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0028)
Stock of Oil Reserves -0.0008 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0046)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0019 -0.0132*** -0.0123*** -0.0115*** -0.0090***
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0018)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity 0.0060 0.0427*** 0.0360** 0.0358** 0.0146
(0.0081) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0095)
PADD HHI 0.6087 3.5383*** 3.1474*** 3.0679*** 1.3910***
(0.3810) (0.7184) (0.7284) (0.6802) (0.4992)
Hurricane 0.0498 0.2480*** 0.2520*** 0.2095*** 0.1785***
(0.0360) (0.0687) (0.0676) (0.0675) (0.0523)
January 0.0030 0.0180 0.0174 0.0210 0.0310
(0.0118) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0210)
February -0.0037 -0.0088 -0.0130 -0.0015 -0.0032
(0.0153) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0246)
March 0.0145 0.0052 0.0030 0.0220 0.0239
(0.0162) (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0253)
April 0.0435*** 0.0682** 0.0635** 0.0889*** 0.0664**
(0.0168) (0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0325) (0.0265)
May 0.0569*** 0.1156*** 0.1090*** 0.1317*** 0.0798***
(0.0175) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0333) (0.0277)
June 0.0351** 0.0902*** 0.0786** 0.1004*** 0.0334
(0.0178) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0346) (0.0291)
July 0.0188 0.0278 0.0178 0.0431 -0.0048
(0.0173) (0.0322) (0.0326) (0.0337) (0.0278)
August 0.0111 -0.0195 -0.0264 0.0053 -0.0164
(0.0169) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0276)
September 0.0133 -0.0199 -0.0258 0.0075 -0.0082
(0.0162) (0.0303) (0.0301) (0.0330) (0.0277)
October 0.0044 -0.0728** -0.0744*** -0.0450 -0.0659**
(0.0160) (0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0275)
November -0.0069 -0.0386** -0.0390** -0.0270 -0.0360*
(0.0112) (0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0208)
Lagged Real Crack Spread 0.4962***
(0.0737)
Constant 0.2460** -0.0815 -0.0139 -0.0171 0.2522
(0.1228) (0.2317) (0.2279) (0.2152) (0.1537)
Observations 132 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.3647 0.7269 0.7385 0.7518 0.8290
37
Table 13: Crack Spread Results PADD IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real Crack Spread
Real Crack Spread w/CPI
Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price
Real Crack Spread Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH w/ CPI oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0067*** -0.0057 -0.0077** -0.0069** -0.0039*
(0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0023)
Real Price of Oil 0.0012 0.0000 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0167** 0.0040
(0.0083) (0.0062)
Gasoline Imports -0.0053** 0.0042 0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0028)
Stock of Oil Reserves -0.0008 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0046)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0019 -0.0132*** -0.0123*** -0.0115*** -0.0090***
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0018)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity 0.0060 0.0427*** 0.0360** 0.0358** 0.0146
(0.0081) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0095)
PADD HHI 0.6087 3.5383*** 3.1474*** 3.0679*** 1.3910***
(0.3810) (0.7184) (0.7284) (0.6802) (0.4992)
Hurricane 0.0498 0.2480*** 0.2520*** 0.2095*** 0.1785***
(0.0360) (0.0687) (0.0676) (0.0675) (0.0523)
January 0.0030 0.0180 0.0174 0.0210 0.0310
(0.0118) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0210)
February -0.0037 -0.0088 -0.0130 -0.0015 -0.0032
(0.0153) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0246)
March 0.0145 0.0052 0.0030 0.0220 0.0239
(0.0162) (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0253)
April 0.0435*** 0.0682** 0.0635** 0.0889*** 0.0664**
(0.0168) (0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0325) (0.0265)
May 0.0569*** 0.1156*** 0.1090*** 0.1317*** 0.0798***
(0.0175) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0333) (0.0277)
June 0.0351** 0.0902*** 0.0786** 0.1004*** 0.0334
(0.0178) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0346) (0.0291)
July 0.0188 0.0278 0.0178 0.0431 -0.0048
(0.0173) (0.0322) (0.0326) (0.0337) (0.0278)
August 0.0111 -0.0195 -0.0264 0.0053 -0.0164
(0.0169) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0276)
September 0.0133 -0.0199 -0.0258 0.0075 -0.0082
(0.0162) (0.0303) (0.0301) (0.0330) (0.0277)
October 0.0044 -0.0728** -0.0744*** -0.0450 -0.0659**
(0.0160) (0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0275)
November -0.0069 -0.0386** -0.0390** -0.0270 -0.0360*
(0.0112) (0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0208)
Lagged Real Crack Spread 0.4962***
(0.0737)
Constant 0.2460** -0.0815 -0.0139 -0.0171 0.2522
(0.1228) (0.2317) (0.2279) (0.2152) (0.1537)
Observations 132 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.3647 0.7269 0.7385 0.7518 0.8290
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Table 14: Crack Spread Results PADD V
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real Crack Spread
Real Crack Spread w/CPI
Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price
Real Crack Spread Real Crack Spread w/ CPI oil price NG price
VARIABLES DH w/ CPI oil price NG price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0067*** -0.0057 -0.0077** -0.0069** -0.0039*
(0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0023)
Real Price of Oil 0.0012 0.0000 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Natural Gas Price 0.0167** 0.0040
(0.0083) (0.0062)
Gasoline Imports -0.0053** 0.0042 0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0028)
Stock of Oil Reserves -0.0008 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0046)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0019 -0.0132*** -0.0123*** -0.0115*** -0.0090***
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0018)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity 0.0060 0.0427*** 0.0360** 0.0358** 0.0146
(0.0081) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0095)
PADD HHI 0.6087 3.5383*** 3.1474*** 3.0679*** 1.3910***
(0.3810) (0.7184) (0.7284) (0.6802) (0.4992)
Hurricane 0.0498 0.2480*** 0.2520*** 0.2095*** 0.1785***
(0.0360) (0.0687) (0.0676) (0.0675) (0.0523)
January 0.0030 0.0180 0.0174 0.0210 0.0310
(0.0118) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0210)
February -0.0037 -0.0088 -0.0130 -0.0015 -0.0032
(0.0153) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0246)
March 0.0145 0.0052 0.0030 0.0220 0.0239
(0.0162) (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0253)
April 0.0435*** 0.0682** 0.0635** 0.0889*** 0.0664**
(0.0168) (0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0325) (0.0265)
May 0.0569*** 0.1156*** 0.1090*** 0.1317*** 0.0798***
(0.0175) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0333) (0.0277)
June 0.0351** 0.0902*** 0.0786** 0.1004*** 0.0334
(0.0178) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0346) (0.0291)
July 0.0188 0.0278 0.0178 0.0431 -0.0048
(0.0173) (0.0322) (0.0326) (0.0337) (0.0278)
August 0.0111 -0.0195 -0.0264 0.0053 -0.0164
(0.0169) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0276)
September 0.0133 -0.0199 -0.0258 0.0075 -0.0082
(0.0162) (0.0303) (0.0301) (0.0330) (0.0277)
October 0.0044 -0.0728** -0.0744*** -0.0450 -0.0659**
(0.0160) (0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0275)
November -0.0069 -0.0386** -0.0390** -0.0270 -0.0360*
(0.0112) (0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0208)
Lagged Real Crack Spread 0.4962***
(0.0737)
Constant 0.2460** -0.0815 -0.0139 -0.0171 0.2522
(0.1228) (0.2317) (0.2279) (0.2152) (0.1537)
Observations 132 132 132 132 131
R-squared 0.3647 0.7269 0.7385 0.7518 0.8290
39
Table 15: Replacing the Crack Spread and Crack Ratio with the Price of Natural Gas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real NG Price
Real NG Price w/CPI
Real NG Price Real NG Price w/ CPI oil price
VARIABLES DH w/ CPI oil price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production -0.0510*** -0.0289 -0.1893*** -0.0649***
(0.0038) (0.0489) (0.0249) (0.0111)
Real Price of Oil 0.0779*** 0.0266***
(0.0069) (0.0036)
Lagged Natural Gas Price 0.6883***
(0.0453)
Gasoline Imports 0.0075 0.1595*** 0.0681** 0.0136
(0.0051) (0.0384) (0.0276) (0.0105)
Stock of Oil Reserves -0.0024 -0.0600** -0.0159 -0.0103**
(0.0022) (0.0246) (0.0112) (0.0042)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves -0.0035 -0.1210*** -0.0638*** -0.0130
(0.0051) (0.0371) (0.0228) (0.0147)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity 0.0098 0.3304*** 0.1288*** 0.0325**
(0.0087) (0.0567) (0.0359) (0.0154)
PADD HHI 0.2973 26.3876*** 9.6291** 0.6404
(0.8009) (6.2408) (3.8105) (1.8742)
Hurricane 0.3632*** 4.6950*** 3.8976*** 2.7588***
(0.0583) (0.2581) (0.2746) (0.1706)
January -0.2846** -0.1425 -0.2621 -0.3554
(0.1397) (0.4185) (0.4130) (0.2517)
February -0.3603** -0.4037 -0.7622* -0.6865**
(0.1602) (0.4939) (0.4467) (0.3124)
March -0.3735** -0.4043 -0.7946 -0.4466
(0.1780) (0.6252) (0.5940) (0.3366)
April -0.4466*** -0.5939 -1.2075** -0.7702***
(0.1543) (0.5746) (0.4751) (0.2667)
May -0.4042** -0.4018 -1.0402** -0.4440*
(0.1624) (0.6191) (0.5250) (0.2347)
June -0.3823** -0.3100 -1.1690** -0.5544**
(0.1497) (0.6287) (0.5692) (0.2526)
July -0.3720*** -0.4559 -1.2474** -0.6562***
(0.1320) (0.5919) (0.4972) (0.2185)
August -0.4643*** -1.0675** -1.6847*** -1.0280***
(0.1296) (0.4197) (0.4714) (0.2908)
September -0.4928*** -1.5328*** -1.9882*** -1.0692***
(0.1291) (0.4351) (0.4959) (0.2482)
October -0.3549*** -1.3687*** -1.6276*** -0.7821***
(0.1005) (0.3258) (0.3603) (0.2359)
November -0.2551*** -0.4038* -0.6328** -0.1932
(0.0809) (0.2203) (0.2908) (0.2788)
PADD II 0.0912 2.7291* 0.5670 0.2516
(0.1623) (1.5072) (0.7073) (0.3657)
PADD III 0.0280 -1.0892 -1.4291 0.2720
(0.3552) (3.9982) (1.7056) (0.5965)
PADD IV 0.0076 1.0089 -0.4428 -0.2050
(0.2480) (1.9707) (1.3092) (0.7780)
PADD V 0.0140 0.0906 -0.6979 -0.0505
(0.1915) (1.4101) (0.7516) (0.5250)
Constant 3.7052*** 3.4199* 4.2473*** 1.8638**
(0.3541) (1.9980) (1.5887) (0.9498)
Observations 660 660 660 655
R-squared 0.7575 0.3359 0.6918 0.9023
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Table 16: Replacing the Crack Spread and Crack Ratio with the US National
Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Rate of Unemployment
Rate of Unemployment oil price
VARIABLES Rate of Unemployment oil price lag
U.S. Ethanol Production 0.2155*** 0.3228*** 0.0311***
(0.0323) (0.0243) (0.0106)
Real Price of Oil -0.0521*** -0.0054**
(0.0081) (0.0024)
Lagged Unemployment 0.9218***
(0.0254)
Gasoline Imports -0.0312 0.0300*** -0.0034
(0.0249) (0.0108) (0.0022)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0153 -0.0142** -0.0014
(0.0185) (0.0070) (0.0011)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves 0.0843*** 0.0460** -0.0018
(0.0279) (0.0212) (0.0033)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -0.1819*** -0.0470 0.0015
(0.0659) (0.0397) (0.0062)
PADD HHI -15.5510*** -4.3403 -1.3336**
(4.9399) (2.7485) (0.5445)
Hurricane 0.0556 0.5891*** 0.1042**
(0.3347) (0.2201) (0.0434)
January -0.1273 -0.0473 0.0074
(0.1465) (0.1163) (0.0727)
February 0.1115 0.3513** 0.0715
(0.2144) (0.1474) (0.0735)
March 0.0280 0.2891* 0.0326
(0.2289) (0.1636) (0.0616)
April 0.1227 0.5331*** 0.0482
(0.2779) (0.2013) (0.0691)
May 0.0134 0.4404* 0.0502
(0.2641) (0.2309) (0.0778)
June 0.0878 0.6624** 0.0898
(0.2408) (0.2636) (0.0579)
July 0.0682 0.5977** 0.0631
(0.2007) (0.2463) (0.0581)
August 0.2053 0.6181*** 0.0533
(0.1716) (0.2217) (0.0667)
September 0.2107 0.5153** 0.0083
(0.1745) (0.2153) (0.0595)
October 0.1967 0.3699* 0.0546
(0.1578) (0.2016) (0.0545)
November 0.1263 0.2795** 0.0477
(0.1144) (0.1223) (0.0696)
PADD II 0.0580 1.5044*** -0.1483
(1.0268) (0.4943) (0.1119)
PADD III 3.5666 3.7940** -0.0684
(2.8683) (1.5911) (0.2500)
PADD IV 0.8347 1.8058** -0.2744
(1.3396) (0.7959) (0.1878)
PADD V 1.6234 2.1509*** -0.1694
(1.1391) (0.7338) (0.1515)
Constant 4.0643** 3.5107*** 0.8344***
(1.6789) (1.0541) (0.2963)
Observations 660 660 655
R-squared 0.7026 0.8710 0.9928
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Table 17: Replacing the Crack Spread and Crack Ratio with European Unemployment
Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES France UK Italy EU 17
U.S. Ethanol Production 0.0242 0.1249*** -0.0196 0.0460*
(0.0227) (0.0168) (0.0345) (0.0275)
Gasoline Imports 0.0158 -0.0339** -0.0598* 0.0073
(0.0164) (0.0147) (0.0332) (0.0185)
Stock of Oil Reserves 0.0092 0.0217*** 0.0103 0.0063
(0.0149) (0.0068) (0.0084) (0.0166)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves 0.0094 0.0252*** 0.0828*** 0.0458*
(0.0205) (0.0094) (0.0300) (0.0245)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -0.0186 -0.1061*** -0.2226*** -0.0793
(0.0482) (0.0177) (0.0588) (0.0612)
PADD HHI 4.3624 -4.5432** -17.1060*** -2.1339
(3.6248) (2.1077) (4.1910) (4.0200)
Hurricane 0.6304*** -0.0647 0.7712*** 0.8178***
(0.1704) (0.1097) (0.2441) (0.2381)
January 0.1756 0.1988* 0.3580* 0.2731**
(0.1194) (0.1023) (0.2048) (0.1202)
February 0.1094 0.4105*** 0.6798*** 0.4499***
(0.1558) (0.1332) (0.2127) (0.1571)
March -0.1824 0.2128* 0.6391** 0.3476**
(0.1642) (0.1290) (0.2531) (0.1730)
April -0.4799*** 0.0877 0.2962 0.0484
(0.1717) (0.1513) (0.2099) (0.1852)
May -0.6548*** 0.0676 -0.0259 -0.1735
(0.1568) (0.1412) (0.1855) (0.1720)
June -0.8686*** 0.3094** -0.2124 -0.2743*
(0.1426) (0.1299) (0.1932) (0.1463)
July -0.7658*** 0.4429*** -0.2650 -0.3205**
(0.1292) (0.1004) (0.2564) (0.1367)
August -0.2916** 0.5269*** -0.6316*** -0.2024*
(0.1447) (0.0968) (0.1949) (0.1189)
September -0.3133** 0.5071*** -0.1462 -0.2247*
(0.1333) (0.0884) (0.1996) (0.1338)
October -0.1511 0.3120*** 0.6116*** -0.0444
(0.1284) (0.0738) (0.1558) (0.1354)
November 0.0332 0.0886* 0.3704*** 0.0282
(0.0713) (0.0467) (0.1247) (0.0791)
PADD II 0.4934 -0.4292 0.4038 0.8543
(0.5837) (0.5223) (0.9469) (0.7063)
PADD III 0.2157 0.8229 5.8412** 2.3681
(1.1358) (1.0840) (2.6377) (1.5861)
PADD IV 1.0238 -0.3610 -0.0232 1.5862
(1.0237) (0.5984) (1.0564) (1.0993)
PADD V 0.6378 0.0633 1.7313 1.6127*
(0.7733) (0.5462) (1.2199) (0.9355)
Constant 7.3281*** 4.7174*** 9.8566*** 6.7900***
(1.3634) (0.7153) (1.3347) (1.4539)
Observations 660 660 660 660
R-squared 0.2989 0.8044 0.4123 0.2464
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Table 18: Replacing the Crack Spread and Crack Ratio with the Age of our Eldest
Children
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Caiden’s Age Hayley’s Age
U.S. Ethanol Production 25.8865*** 53.8108***
(5.7118) (4.7647)
Gasoline Imports -3.1858 -8.7102**
(3.3247) (3.9439)
Stock of Oil Reserves 4.0113** 3.1661**
(1.8910) (1.3167)
Stock of Gasoline Reserves 10.9784*** 11.4741***
(3.6859) (3.5632)
PADD Reﬁning Capacity -28.0678*** -33.4530***
(8.4381) (7.4211)
PADD HHI -879.7402** -2,387.1209***
(351.8799) (636.9141)
Hurricane 10.3884 -29.4121
(26.2655) (40.3126)
January -34.6948 -17.5209
(28.4884) (25.0491)
February -9.6649 30.7343
(28.4839) (26.3026)
March -23.1607 -4.6545
(31.0048) (25.6808)
April -12.7036 23.2237
(31.9306) (27.1828)
May -23.5306 1.0996
(31.4708) (26.3290)
June -13.2790 20.0907
(29.0449) (23.7165)
July -11.3031 10.5299
(26.8571) (20.7181)
August 10.9361 29.9701
(24.6202) (20.7446)
September 20.8261 51.9167***
(22.5878) (19.8808)
October 16.2497 34.8851**
(19.6468) (16.9128)
November 8.6881 21.8478*
(13.7765) (12.5424)
PADD II 102.1897 -7.3319
(133.6321) (136.3652)
PADD III 541.5290* 670.8513*
(324.5961) (393.3148)
PADD IV 221.4995 -26.6085
(177.2805) (138.7572)
PADD V 289.9066 190.6577
(177.7480) (156.6392)
Constant -337.5345 -102.3287
(223.9487) (178.1661)
Observations 660 660
R-squared 0.7411 0.9174
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